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Colonialmodernism and the
flawed paradigms of urban
renewal: uneven development
in Bombay,1900^25
S A N D I P H A Z A R E E S I N G H
School of History and Archaeology, Cardiff University, Cardiff, CF10 3XU
abstract: This article explores the failure of urban renewal in Bombay city
during the ®rst quarter of the twentieth century. It shows how colonial rule
structured a class-driven process of uneven urban `improvements' that actually
exacerbated the problems of congestion, bad housing and environmental blight.
In this process, the new forces of modernity were selectively appropriated to
accentuate the differentiation in built forms and urban spaces. Finally, through
implicit comparisons with contemporary developments in Europe, it reveals the
limitations of urban regeneration in a laissez-faire colonial capitalist environment
where the search for quick returns by competing economic actors precluded the
adoption of long-term policies and interventionist strategies necessary to create
the good city life.
Contemporary Bombay is amongst the world's largest and fastest
growing cities, its population of over 15 million making it the sixth
largest city in the world today; slum and pavement dwellers, however,
make up over one-third of these inhabitants.1 Within the next decade of
this millennium century, the majority of the world's population will, for
the ®rst time in history, become urban dwellers, and most will be living
in the `new' megacities of the south such as Bombay. This phenomenal
urban growth, often caused by the failure of rural cycles and of suburban
development projects, represents one of the main symptoms of the
`maldevelopment' of many southern societies, with city life becoming
increasingly unsustainable as a result of demographic implosion,
poverty, overcrowding, and environmental health risks.2
In spite of the suggestive work of Anthony King over two decades
ago,3 there have been remarkably few attempts to trace the historical
genesis of this situation, and to explore in particular, the urban policies
1 H. Girardet, The Gaia Atlas of Cities (London, 1996), 75, 182±4.
2 B. Gleeson and N. Low, `Cities as consumers of the world's environment', in N. Low,
B. Gleeson, I. Elander and R. Lidskog (eds), Consuming Cities (London, 2000), 10±11.
3 A. King, Colonial Urban Development (London, 1976); and idem, `Colonial architecture re-
visited: some issues for further debate', in K. Ballhatchet and D. Taylor (eds), Changing
South Asia: Economy and Society (London, 1984), 99±106.
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of the colonial era.4 After all, like other colonial cities (and particularly
colonial port-cities), the growth of Bombay closely parallels the expan-
sion of the needs of European empires (chie¯y the British Empire) and
the emergence of a global economy. Indeed, the power of colonial
authorities to command and shape urban space is of primary signi®cance
in understanding the development of many contemporary `Third World'
cities. In particular, an examination of the intensi®ed production of
urban space in the late or `industrial' colonial era, facilitated by the new
possibilities of modern technologies, and of the changing framework of
the colonial political economy during this period, might well offer a
revealing glimpse of the formative stage of urban development para-
digms whose constraining effects have continued to cast a long shadow
over Bombay. By identifying the primary determinants of colonial spatial
practice and by showing how inter-colonial land rivalries and competi-
tion for quick pro®ts in¯uenced the nature of built forms as well as the
level of population densities and the outcome of initial suburbanization
schemes, this essay will attempt to trace the colonial historical origins of
Bombay's current predicament.
Colonial spatial practice
Bombay was not an indigenous Indian city. It did not evolve from an
original sacred centre or a place of pilgrimage, but represents the
outcome of an evolving process of colonial domination which created its
own strati®ed urban forms and demographic patterns.
During the initial phase of `mercantile colonialism' from the late
seventeenth century to the early nineteenth, Bombay, under the control-
ling hand of the East India Company, gradually evolved as a built
environment designed to facilitate the extraction and concentration of
vast quantities of opium and cotton from its rural hinterland, and to
enable their shipment abroad. These commodities provided the basis for
a ¯ourishing colonial trade with China,5 while raw cotton exports to
England contributed signi®cantly to new domestic consumption patterns
which paved the way for Britain's industrial take-off.6 Spatially, Bombay
4 There has, nonetheless, been some very interesting urban historical work on Bombay
generally focusing on the nineteenth century: A. Farooqui, `Urban development in a
colonial situation: early nineteenth century Bombay', Economic and Political Weekly, 31, 40
(1996), 2746±59; C. Dobbin, Urban Leadership in Western India (Oxford, 1972); M. Dossal,
Imperial Designs and Indian Realities (Delhi, 1991); I. Klein, `Urban development and death:
Bombay city, 1870±1914', Modern Asian Studies, 20, 4 (1986), 725±54; J. Masselos, `Appro-
priating urban space: social constructs of Bombay in the time of the Raj', South Asia, 14, 1
(1991), 33±65; F. Conlon, `Industrialization and the housing problem in Bombay,
1850±1940', in Ballhatchet and Taylor, Changing South Asia. Closer to the colonial
modernist concerns of this essay are, more recently, Z. Celik, Urban Forms and Colonial
Confrontations: Algiers under French Rule (Berkeley, 1997); and N. Perera, Society and Space:
Colonialism, Nationalism, and Postcolonial Identity in Sri Lanka (Denver, 1998).
5 Farooqui, `Urban development in a colonial situation', 2748±49.
6 D. Washbrook, `From comparative sociology to global history: Britain and India in the
236 Urban History
was thus conceived as a regional centre of colonial mercantile capital
accumulation, at the heart of an export-oriented network of communica-
tions centred on its port.
The development of built structures between the early eighteenth and
the mid-nineteenth centuries, created `the Fort' (the expanding forti®ed
harbour area) as the dominant urban social space and the nucleus of
early colonial settlement. However, the East India Company's enforced
reliance upon native brokers to secure pro®table trade transactions with
the Bombay hinterland, ensured the granting of property rights to elite
merchant communities ± Banias, Bohras and, particularly, Parsis ± who
thus participated in the development of the Fort's built environment.
By the early nineteenth century, the overwhelming concentration of
commercial activities and employment opportunities in the Fort had led
to a diverse population in¯ux and created the conditions for urban
congestion. The demand for housing, moreover, also led to a sharp rise
in the value of land not only in the Fort but also in the growing `Indian
town' just beyond the forti®cations. With the strengthening of capitalist
property rights in the early decades of the nineteenth century, invest-
ment in urban real estate provided lucrative new opportunities for
indigenous merchants who had prospered through the opium and
cotton trade with China.7 Ownership of land and buildings not only
brought lucrative returns but also enabled a more ¯exible strategy of
capital accumulation, giving rise to a new `class faction' of substantial
landlords.
The transfer of authority from the East India Company to the British
state following the Rebellion of 1857 led to a drive to reconstruct social
space in the Fort. Additional land was created as a result of the
demolition of the ramparts and through reclamations from the sea, as a
more pervasive colonial presence now strove to erase built signs of its
military origins and highlight instead the city as a prosperous centre of
commercial enterprise, illustrative of imperial power and prestige. The
opened up sites were occupied by planned public buildings designed to
display the architectural arts of a `superior' civilization. During the late
nineteenth century, there emerged a range of public edi®ces such as the
Bombay High Court and the Municipal Corporation in the `neo-Gothic'
style originally devised by John Ruskin and William Morris as, ironically,
a rebellion against the tastelessness of mainstream English Victorian
architecture. Most prominent of all was that architectural ode to the
imperial venture, the Victoria Terminus building: with its deliberate,
unsubtle symbolism ± it featured mounted ®gures representing `Pro-
gress', `Commerce' and `Engineering' ± the new railway terminal
pre-history of modernity', Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 40, 4
(1997), 417±19.
7 Particularly in the decades following the British Government's abrogation of the East
India Company's trading monopolies in 1813.
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clinched the Fort's function as the spatial embodiment of an emerging
colonial industrial modernism.
Meanwhile, demand for Indian cotton rose considerably as a result of
the American Civil War. It marked a boom period of capital accumula-
tion for indigenous merchants and provided further opportunities for
diversi®cation. From the 1860s, capital began to be increasingly invested
in the building of cotton mills,8 and by the end of the century a new
industrial landscape, created out of the ®lling in of previously empty
lowlands, had emerged virtually adjoining the northern portion of the
congested Indian town. To house the migrant workers arriving in the
city from the hinterlands of the Konkan and the Deccan, entrepreneurial
landlords built the most basic tenement chawls on the premise that the
chronically low-waged workers would only be able to pay a cursory
rent. In the absence of regulations specifying minimum adequate living
space, home amenities, or open space between buildings, one-room
tenements were erected on `every inch of available land' without
connections to drains or sewer pipes. Their overcrowded occupants
were described as living in `incredible' poverty and subsisting on a
`starvation diet'.9
By the turn of the century, a new city had indeed come into being, but
one that was marked by environmental degradation, human poverty and
health pandemics. Overcrowded and insanitary buildings threatened the
lives of their occupants, facilitating the spread of diseases such as
tuberculosis; the coal-powered cotton mills, railway locomotives and
government Mint churned out thick black smoke which caused a
deterioration in air quality and increased susceptibility to respiratory
illnesses. Lingering dark clouds brought about `a marked change . . .
over localities such as Byculla, Parel, Tardeo, Tarwadi and even remote
Sewri'.10 The very topography of the city, built on ¯atlands between the
sea and the coastal hills, worked against the rapid dispersal of industrial
emissions. During the day, the prevailing sea breeze funnelled the
smoke-®lled air towards the hills; however, the direction of the night-
time breeze ensured that, for much of the year, the polluted air drifted
back over the city.11 Moreover, while the Municipal Corporation ex-
panded the city's water supply, this was not matched by the construction
of a comprehensive drainage system, leaving the vast majority of
localities north of the Fort without adequate drains or sewers. Much of
the soil in the low-lying central districts of the city remained perma-
nently waterlogged and liable to be permeated by disease microbes,
creating a favourable ecology for the spread of malaria and plague.12
8 R. Chandavarkar, The Origins of Industrial Capitalism in India. Business Strategies and the
Working Classes in Bombay 1900±1940 (Cambridge, 1994), 65.
9 Census of India, 1901: vol. x, Bombay (Town & Island), part iv, 151, 144.
10 Ibid., 151.
11 N. Crook, Principles of Population and Development (Oxford, 1998), 81.
12 Klein, `Urban development', 735±45.
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The severity of the end-of-century plague pandemic13 revealed the
environmental degeneration achieved by almost a century of anarchic
laissez-faire urban development in which land and buildings were
primarily resources for capital accumulation by urban elites. Private
owners and users of land had been allowed virtually absolute freedom
to produce insanitary built structures and social spaces which had come
to exercise a progressively degenerative impact on the global urban
fabric.
Competing colonialisms: `improvement' strategies and urban
land rivalries
Bombay followed the tradition of pre-industrial urban Europe where
plague and congestion had often spurred the renewal of city centres.14
The `old plague' of medieval European knowledge had now, however,
arrived in a city simultaneously experiencing the impact of an indigen-
ously driven initial phase of industrialization, and ± as a result of
Bombay's position in the imperial market-place ± of the technological
innovations and artefacts associated with the second industrial revo-
lution of the late nineteenth century in the West. Modern industrial
colonialism served both to re®ne and accentuate the iniquitous spatial
practices inherited from the mercantilist era.
Plague induced a widespread elite consensus that a bold initiative was
required to `clean up' the city. However, in the absence of any real local
medical knowledge about the disease,15 and of even less colonial interest
in the political dimensions of the major improvements in public health
secured by contemporary British cities,16 slum clearance and reinforced
social segregation were seized upon as the crucial elements of urban
renewal. The example of the Glasgow Improvement Trust17 led to the
Government of Bombay setting up the Bombay City Improvement Trust
13 Plague became the main cause of death in the city in the decade 1897±1907: ibid., 744.
14 H. Meller, `Urban renewal and citizenship: the quality of life in British cities, 1890±1990',
Urban History, 22, 1 (1995), 63. Disease continued to be, of course, the fundamental
motivator of urban renewal projects in modern cities: A. Fairchild and D. Rosner, `The
living city: engineering social and urban change in New York City, 1865±1920', Bulletin of
the History of Medicine, 73, 1 (Spring 1999).
15 M. Harrison, Public Health in British India: Anglo-Indian Preventive Medicine 1859±1914
(Cambridge, 1994), 134.
16 In particular, the municipalization of local government in the late nineteenth century,
with councillors now elected on an enlarged franchise, led to improved and expanded
urban services (water, gas, electricity, public transport, sewage puri®cation, street
cleansing, parks, housing, maternity welfare) often directly operated by municipalities.
These were largely paid for by taxes on the rental value of property. See T. Hart, `Urban
growth and municipal government: Glasgow in comparative context 1846±1914', in
A. Slaven and D.H. Aldcroft (eds), Business, Banking, and Urban History (Edinburgh,
1982).
17 Established in 1866 by an Act of Parliament in the wake of recurring typhus and cholera
epidemics, the Glasgow Improvement Trust's objectives were to acquire and clear for
redevelopment approximately 90 acres of the most crowded residential neighbourhoods
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in 1898; like its British model, the Trust was dominated by local elites.18
With its initial focus on slum clearance as the primary instrument of
sanitary reform, the new body passed over a unique opportunity to
draw on lessons of decades of British urban `improvement' schemes
whose neglect of housing provision had generally resulted in the
shifting, rather than the abolition, of overcrowding.
The inhabitants of the initial slum target areas, in Nagpada, Mandvi,
Market and Chandanvadi, found themselves compulsorily evicted
without being offered alternative accommodation; as a result, they
attempted to rehouse themselves in tenements just outside the targeted
neighbourhoods. Alongside the Trust's operations, the Municipality's
enforcement of the new Epidemic Diseases Act also led to the removal of
a tier of living rooms from the middle of large insanitary houses with the
aim of creating a chowk (passage) to allow light and air into the
buildings.19 Slum eradication thus led to an increased demand for
housing which immediately caused a sharp rise in rents. This demand
was largely met by private landlords adding new storeys to their old
insanitary tenements. Indeed, as fast as `many houses had chowks cut in
them' they `also had storeys added'.20 Not only did this result in the
worsening of congestion21 but also in an increase in the cost of acquiring
slum property by the Improvement Trust.22
The primary strategy of overcoming congestion through slum eradica-
tion thus ¯oundered on the housing issue. Repeating the British experi-
ence, the Trust's rapid clearing of slums was not matched by the
construction of affordable homes, thereby enabling landlords to step in
and simply continue their practice of erecting the most hazardous and
unhealthy buildings to accommodate the urban poor. By 1909, the Trust
had evicted over 50,000 people from demolished one-room tenements,
but its new sanitary chawls only contained 2,844 rooms.23 Moreover,
landlords' control over the Municipal Corporation, strengthened by the
colonial state's refusal to democratize the municipal franchise,24 ensured
of the old city: N.J. Morgan, `Building the city', in W.H. Fraser and I. Maver (eds),
Glasgow. Volume II: 1830 to 1912 (Manchester, 1996), 21.
18 Its Board comprised the Military Commander of Bombay District, the Collector of Land
Revenue, the (government-appointed) Bombay Municipal Commissioner, and leading
members of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce, the Millowners Association and the
Municipal Corporation: Bombay Improvement Trust, `City Improvement Trust Report,
1907', iv.
19 J.P. Orr, Social Reform and Slum Reform (Bombay, 1917), part II, 23.
20 Ibid.
21 With the bene®t of hindsight, the Trust subsequently admitted this. Its initial operations
had `. . . tended only to make bad worse, to intensify congestion where it already existed
and to extend it to comparatively open areas just beyond the original congested zone':
Bombay Improvement Trust, `City Improvement Trust Report, 1919', 121.
22 These costs were already high as the Trust had no power to acquire only parts of
buildings: Government of Bombay, `Local self-government proceedings, 1916', 930.
23 Orr, Social Reform, 23.
24 Between 1888 and 1923, there was no democratic advance in terms of the widening of
the municipal franchise. By 1914, only 1 per cent of the urban population ± 11,500 citizens
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their continued ability to resist the adoption of a uniform, sanitary
building code. Indeed, as in Glasgow, the Improvement Trust's powers
of compulsory land acquisition and its emergence as a substantial land-
owner in its own right,25 led to open con¯ict with the city's in¯uential
landlords who made full use of the Corporation to criticize and oppose
Trust schemes.
The emergence of the Improvement Trust (and through it, of the local
colonial state) as a major player in the land market necessarily led to
intensi®ed competition for the scarce commodity of urban land. It meant
that each of the dominant class factions ± commercial companies
(European and Indian), landlords, merchants, industrialists ± now found
their options drastically curtailed, particularly as increasing demand for
a scarce resource fuelled speculation, especially during the war years,
and led to the rapid spiralling of land prices. This was not only true in
the old city but also in the northern suburbs where the price of an acre of
land shot up from between Rs. 200±1,500 in 1916 to Rs. 5,000±25,000 in
1919.26 As the Government of India controlled the railway companies,
the colonial state also had direct interests in urban land. In 1904 the
central government acquired, on behalf of the Great Indian Peninsula
Railway, a very substantial area of land at Matunga without informing
the Bombay government, the Municipal Corporation or the Improve-
ment Trust. The Municipal Commissioner slammed the Railway Compa-
nies' `land hunger', accusing them of seeking `to turn the city into a
station yard with a few houses dotted about here and there'.27 In a 1907
consultative memorandum on the `future development of the city', the
Bombay government seemed to agree that the railways had been
allowed to appropriate far too much urban space. It now appeared to
advocate restrictions on railway development in favour of the construc-
tion of `broad northern and southern thoroughfares'.28
It was clear that, given the shape of the island, north-south movement
had much greater potential to open up large areas for eventual settle-
ment than east-west movement. However, the two major road projects
completed by the Improvement Trust prior to the First World War,
Princess Street (1905) and Sandhurst Road (1909), were both rather
limited east-west thoroughfares. Princess Street ran from Carnac Bridge,
± had the right to vote. In 1923, the new ten-rupee rental franchise extended the number
of voters to 75,000, or 7 per cent of the population, still less than one-eighth of the
numbers now entitled to vote in Glasgow as a result of the Representation of the People
Act of 1918: Bombay Chronicle, 25 Jan. 1916; 30 Jan. 1923; 2 Feb. 1923.
25 By 1915, Trust-owned estates comprised 10 per cent of all urban land: Bombay Chronicle, 6
Feb. 1917.
26 The Times of India, 25 Sep. 1919.
27 Government of Bombay, `Medical proceedings, 1905', 128.
28 The consultation document invited responses from the city's elite commercial bodies ±
the Chamber of Commerce, the Millowners' Association, the Indian Merchants'
Chamber, as well as from the Improvement Trust and the Port Trust: Government of
Bombay, `Local self-government proceedings, 1909', 71.
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just north of the Fort, to Queen's Road on the south-western seafront.
Once again, the project caused large-scale dishousing which led to an
increase in overcrowding in nearby Cavel, just north-west of the new
development, where `large numbers of insanitary houses' had `new
storeys added to them', making light and ventilation in neighbouring
houses even worse than before.29 In contrast, the new road proved very
bene®cial to colonial and Indian elites, providing a quicker route to work
on their daily journey from Malabar Hill and Cumballa Hill to the Fort
area. Wide enough for the new motor cars, Princess Street ampli®ed elite
residential movement away from the old city centre towards the west of
the island.
A decade of Improvement Trust schemes had no impact on over-
crowding in the most congested parts of the inner city. Plague remained
a constant menace, periodic outbreaks exacting a high death toll, while
there was no abatement in the familiar diseases of malaria and
smallpox.30 The Improvement Trust blamed the Municipal Corporation's
failure to amend the building by-laws in favour of a universal sanitary
code and, with its costs rising, complained increasingly of its inadequate
subsidy from the Bombay government;31 the Corporation in turn
accused the Trust of overspending on roads to the detriment of direct
slum clearance;32 it also asserted that it had no sanitary jurisdiction over
the vast tracts of government and railway land; not to be outdone, the
Bombay government was scathing about the Corporation's apathy, nor
was it even averse to blaming the Trust for displacing `considerable
numbers of the poorer classes' and for not providing them with alter-
native sanitary dwellings!
In spite of the consistently high level of frustration at their failure to
reverse the process of environmental degeneration, the colonial agencies
never questioned the shibboleth that urban development should remain
driven by the pro®t and prestige motives of the dominant classes.
Signi®cantly, a rare Bombay government pre-war urban policy initiative,
the 1909 Resolution on the `Development of Bombay City', was primarily
concerned with increasing the social space `available for occupation by
the wealthy classes'.33 Privileging yet again the south of the city, it
declared that this ought to be achieved `by means of reclamation in Back
29 J.P. Orr, Density of Population in Bombay (Bombay, 1914), 9; Bombay Improvement Trust,
`City Improvement Trust Report, 1913', 127.
30 Bombay Gazette, 24 Feb. 1905 and 18 Mar. 1909.
31 Bombay Improvement Trust, `City Improvement Trust Reports' (1913), 147 and (1916),
102.
32 Letter from President, Bombay Municipal Corporation, to Secretary, Government of
Bombay (General Department), 29 Jul. 1915; Bombay Improvement Trust, `City Improve-
ment Trust Report, 1916', 98.
33 The following paragraphs are based on Government of Bombay General Department
Resolution no. 3022, 14 Jun. 1909, `Development of Bombay City and the improvement of
communications in the Island': Government of Bombay, `Local self-government proceed-
ings, 1909', 381±6.
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Bay', since the `well-to-do' residents of Bombay should continue to be
housed in the south-west of the city, `as near the Fort as houses at
suitable rents are available'. Similarly, accommodation for mill workers
and labourers should remain close to factories and docks in the centre
and east, as long as hours of work and wages did not `permit their
travelling any distance' from their workplace. Only the `middle class
worker', who could afford the cost of public transport, could be
persuaded to move to the suburban north-west and eventually, to the
still largely undeveloped island of Salsette beyond the existing city
boundaries. Such spatial segregation had to be maintained `otherwise
the interests of one class will suffer by the intrusion, into areas unsuitable
for them, of residents of another'.34
With the constant increase in the working-class population during
this period, this was a recipe for exacerbating congestion in the
densely populated central districts as it necessarily implied either the
increase or the extension of built structures over a ®nite land surface
area. Nor were the colonial authorities unaware of the new technolo-
gical factor of the electri®ed railway or of public interventionist
initiatives such as cheap workers' trains which, between them, were
widely perceived as the potential answer to the limited availability of
land in European inner cities.35 The Bombay government's own mem-
orandum of 1907 had referred to the possibilities of `free and rapid
communication by rail and tramway' as well as of `cheap workmen's
trains or workmen's tramways' which would enable working-class
accommodation `in the less frequented portions of the Island where
land is available on easy terms'. But these ideas were now decisively
rejected, the Resolution describing as `premature' any `scheme for an
electric railway for the conveyance of suburban passenger traf®c'. Only
with the establishment of the projected upper-class residential enclave
in Colaba following the reclamations in Back Bay, would railway
electri®cation become, `in course of time', a realistic option. Other
possibilities of rapid transit such as overhead trackless trolleys and
underground railways were also dismissed as `beyond the scope of the
immediate requirements of the Island'. The prospect of subsidized
transport for workers, an increasingly important aspect of industrial
policy in several European cities, also fell by the wayside since there
was `practically a consensus of opinion on the part of all the bodies
consulted' that no such special measures were necessary. The fact that
the Resolution often simply echoed the responses of the elite commer-
cial bodies that were consulted reveals the extent to which the Bombay
34 Ibid., 72.
35 P. Capuzzo, `Between politics and technology: transportation as a factor of mass
suburbanisation in Europe 1890±1939', 1, Paper presented at a conference on `Suburba-
nising the masses: public transport and urban development in historical perspective',
National Railway Museum, York, Nov. 1997.
Colonial modernism in Bombay 243
government remained bound to a host of particularistic and competing
economic actors, each of whom was equally committed to the imme-
diacy of its perceived interests.
The politics of built forms: high design and sick buildings
The substantial expansion in built forms is a signi®cant and revealing
aspect of the city's history during the ®rst quarter of the twentieth
century. Sometime during the war years, Bombay achieved the status of
a demographic `mega-city' and joined the select ranks of about twenty
world cities with a population of over a million inhabitants. However,
while Bombay's population rose by over 50 per cent between 1901 and
1921,36 buildings classi®ed as `residential' only increased by 11 per cent,
a probable indication of the effects of `improvement' schemes on urban
housing accommodation. In contrast, mills and factories increased by 328
per cent, while godowns (warehouses) used by commercial enterprises,
railways, tramways and docks, grew by over 400 per cent. The increase
in this category of buildings was the single most important factor in the
overall expansion of built structures during this period.37 Signi®cantly,
too, the density of buildings closely corresponded with the density of
population. The most overcrowded central wards of the city38 also
experienced the most intense pressure of buildings on the land: over
®fteen buildings per acre.39 Indeed, congestion and its attendant envir-
onmental problems were due less to population density per se than to the
ever growing spatial extension of insanitary buildings.
This was also the era that witnessed a considerable development in
of®cial colonial public building. The General Post Of®ce, the new
Custom House, the JJ School of Art, the Prince of Wales Museum, the
Royal Institute of Science and the Gateway of India, were all built by the
Bombay government between 1905 and 1925, with no expenses spared.40
These buildings displayed an organic unity of imperial form and colonial
function. On the one hand, they harnessed the possibilities of new
technological developments and created an imposing yet versatile archi-
tectural language to signify modern imperial power and prestige. The
`unprecedented plasticity'41 of reinforced concrete was used to cast the
impressive domes of the General Post Of®ce, the Prince of Wales
Museum and the Gateway of India, enabling a peculiar mixing of styles
which fused European classical traditions and Indian sources. While this
36 From 776,006 to 1,175,914.
37 Census of India, 1921: vol. ix, Cities of the Bombay Presidency, part B, vi±vii.
38 Chakla, Bhuleshwar, Kumbharwada, Kamatipura and Second Nagpada.
39 Census of India, 1921: Cities, ii±vi.
40 C.W. London, `Edwardian architects of Bombay: George Wittet and John Begg', MARG
46, 1 (Bombay, 1994), 37±52.
41 C. Chant, `Materials: steel and concrete', in idem (ed.), Science, Technology and Everyday
Life (London, 1989), 155.
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innovative style42 expressed mastery over Indian architectural forms, the
sheer size and elevation of the new edi®ces achieved a dwar®ng of
human scale and a domination of the immediate spatial environment,
providing the Fort with new monumental landmarks. At the same time,
these buildings also had speci®c functions which expressed the ex-
panding ambitions of the colonial state in the late imperial era. They
served to centralize and speed up communications (the GPO), to
socialize citizens in the established canons of Western culture (the JJ
School of Art, the Royal Institute of Science), and to provide an
authoritative interpretation of the Indian past (the Prince of Wales
Museum).
The new public buildings were expressions of colonial high design
and contributed to the modernist renewal of the Fort. Meanwhile, the
new medium of cinema was emerging from early exhibitions in tents
and in the open air, and acquiring its own specially designed buildings.
Predictably, `picture palaces' were pioneered in the Fort where initially,
spatial constraints made it easier to renovate and reconvert old theatres.
The Empire, which opened in 1916, was rebuilt `out of all recognition' to
its previous incarnation, in a `cream and gold colour scheme' and `with a
balcony and a lounge with tea rooms on the ®rst ¯oor'.43 Cinema initially
attracted a number of predominantly Parsi entrepreneurs who were
already active in a range of modern commercial enterprises. The most
eminent, J.F. Madan,44 chose to locate two of his most prestigious
picture-houses, the Imperial and the Empress, in the middle-class locality
of Girgaum on land leased from the Improvement Trust on Lamington
Road. Just off the new Sandhurst Road, Lamington Road was at the heart
of one of the Trust's most valuable inner-city real estate development
zones and included new elite residential plots. The high rental returns of
this location, Madan's expanding cinema empire,45 and the growing
commercial potential of moving pictures, all made this a highly remu-
nerative business venture for the Trust.
The conceptually original, comfortable cinemas in the Fort and
Girgaum catered predominantly, though not exclusively, to upper-class
Europeans and Indians. In contrast, the cheaper cinemas in the centre
and north of the city were constructed for the rapidly growing working-
class movie audiences. By the mid-1920s, workers had indeed overtaken
`educated Indians' as the predominant urban cinema audience.46 Unlike
42 This became known as `Indo-Saracenic' architecture and represented a self-conscious
colonial attempt to design of®cial buildings which re¯ected their Indian environment.
43 Bombay Chronicle, 2 Dec. 1916.
44 In addition to his cinema interests, Madan was also an importer of foods, liquors and
pharmaceutical products, and also dealt in real estate and insurance: E. Barnouw and
S. Krishnaswamy, Indian Film (Delhi, 1980), 8.
45 By 1927, Madan Theatres owned 8 out of 18 cinemas in the city: Indian Cinematograph
Committee 1927±28: `Evidence', vol.1, 348.
46 Two-thirds of all cinema-goers were now described as belonging to `the illiterate classes':
ibid., 1.
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the Imperial and the Empress, however, entrepreneurs built cinemas such
as the Venus and the Lakshmi, close to Parel's mill district, as `unpreten-
tious constructions' devoid of the architectural qualities, and the ame-
nities, of the picture palaces of south Bombay.47 There were frequent
complaints about the cinemas on Falkland Road and Grant Road in
particular: a combination of overcrowding, cigarette-smoking, low ceil-
ings, and narrow and insuf®cient emergency exits, made them liable to
`spontaneous combustion'; while their inadequate latrines and location
in the immediate vicinity of milch cattle and horse stables rendered them
very much an extension of their wider insanitary environment.48
In contrast to these developments, the crisis in working-class housing
showed little sign of being resolved. As we have seen, in the years
preceding the First World War, the Improvement Trust was primarily
concerned with the removal of insanitary slums: the provision of social
housing was never one of its fundamental aims.49 Moreover, although
other options were now conceivable, of®cial colonial thinking remained
dominated by the shibboleth of maintaining workers' residential proxi-
mity to their workplace. Many of these residential areas were within the
already highly congested central inner-city localities, the target of the
Improvement Trust's regeneration and road-building schemes. The net
effect of these operations was to reduce both the actual and potential
housing space within the central working-class neighbourhoods, while
at the same time raising the value of central urban real estate and
consequently, rents.50
After a decade of ineffective and costly slum clearance operations, the
Improvement Trust ®nally began to slow down the process of building
demolition and attempted to rehouse displaced tenants in new chawls.
Between 1909 and 1918, the Trust demolished 7,823 and constructed
9,311 one-room tenements on its estates. These were never meant to
satisfy the quantitative needs of the labouring population but merely to
provide qualitative housing models `by way of encouragement to private
enterprise . . . to take on the work' after the Trust had made a start.51
Incorporating some of the principles of modern sanitary housing, the
new tenements rapidly came to be seen as the cream of one-room
housing accommodation in Bombay. However, very few mill hands,
47 Report of the Indian Cinematograph Committee 1927±28, 19.
48 Newspapers received constant letters of complaint calling for municipal intervention to
enforce sanitary conveniences and safety measures on cinema proprietors: Times of India,
6 Jun. 1919; Bombay Chronicle, 4 Nov. 1924.
49 The Trust received the bulk of its funding from the landlord-dominated Municipal
Corporation which was hostile to any public housing programme; it also raised a
substantial part of its revenue by developing and leasing vacant lands and, invariably,
commercial rather than residential leases provided the highest returns.
50 In the two decades between 1898, the year of the Trust's creation, and 1918, properties
and rents in south and central Bombay were estimated to have increased by 100±200 per
cent: The Times of India, 18 Apr. 1919.
51 Orr, Social Reform, 27, 6.
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construction workers, or dockers were able to afford the `self-supporting'
average monthly rent of Rs. 3.50±5.00 per room in Trust chawls.52 The
higher rentals both re¯ected the spiralling land values and the continued
use by the Trust of the imported construction materials of cement and
steel, now in shorter supply and more expensive as a result of war
conditions.53 By 1914, the average monthly wage of the labouring
population was Rs. 15±20, with over 75 per cent of industrial workers
owing average debts of Rs. 104 to moneylenders.54 The Chairman of the
Trust himself admitted that there were `more of the middle class
accommodated on the Trust estates at present than of the poorer
classes'.55
Nor was private enterprise particularly keen to take up the Trust's
invitation. In fact, the few private owners of large stretches of building
land now tended to hold on to their properties in anticipation of a
continuing rise in land values, thus keeping the most amenable building
sites off the market.56 Instead, the virtually universal response to the
rising popular demand for accommodation was for landlords to extend
their old chawls upwards and outwards, aggravating in the process the
insanitary phenomenon of `sweating building sites' and creating yet
more `sick buildings'.57 This also enabled them to continue to operate
outside the regulations of the new municipal building code of 1919
which only applied to `new buildings to be constructed on land pre-
viously unbuilt upon'.58
By the end of the war years, `house famine', affecting particularly the
working classes, was seen as Bombay's most acute social problem.59 `The
greatest and most urgent task to which Bombay must devote itself now
and for years to come', stated the Bombay Chronicle, `is to build houses ±
to build, to build, and to build well and with foresight.' The paper went
on to suggest that local authorities should attempt to emulate the
London County Council's ambitious post-war subsidized popular
housing programme.60 With little response from private enterprise, the
52 Bombay Improvement Trust, `City Improvement Trust Report, 1920', 28.
53 Bombay Presidency Administrative Reports 1917±18, 57±8; and 1918±19, 37±8.
54 Bombay Chronicle, 12 May 1916. Workers' dif®culties in meeting daily living expenses
were compounded by the standard practice, amongst mill owners, of keeping wages in
arrears for 6±8 weeks: Bombay Chronicle, 15 May 1917.
55 Oral evidence by J.P. Orr, Chairman of the Trust, to the Bombay Development
Committee: Government of Bombay, `Report of the Bombay Development Committee,
1914', 287±88. The majority of tenants appear to have been clerks and shopkeepers.
56 Bombay Improvement Trust, `City Improvement Trust Report, 1919', 123.
57 Indeed, this was especially marked in `represented' areas, i.e. the most congested central
urban neighbourhoods: Bombay Improvement Trust, `City Improvement Trust Report
1913', 123; J.P. Orr, The Need for Co-operation Between Neighbours in the Development of
Building Estates (Bombay, 1915), 1.
58 Government of Bombay, `Local self-government proceedings, 1919', 785.
59 The Bombay Central Labour Federation estimated that at least 50,000 workers in the city
were homeless and slept on pavements: Government of Bombay, `Judicial proceedings,
1922', 334.
60 Bombay Chronicle, 30 Jun. 1919.
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Bombay government set up a new `Development Department' which
was given the responsibility of constructing `at least 50,000 one-room
tenements' which, it believed, would ®nally solve the problem of
working-class accommodation.61 Like the Improvement Trust, the new
government department was endowed with powers of compulsory land
acquisition and amounted to yet another authoritarian `quango' charac-
terized by secretive deliberations and the absence of public consultation
procedures.62 Moreover, there was no departure from the obligation to
realize `full market values' on land transactions and to impose `self-
supporting' rents on workers. There were to be no subsidies.63
Such dogged determination not to learn from the experience of the
Improvement Trust meant that the Development Department's failure
was even more ignominious, and a greater ®nancial cost. In the end, less
than 17,000 tenements were actually built, and only one-®fth of these
ever came to be occupied. The `very small' numbers who took up
tenancies consisted of `clerks, superior artisans, and small shop-keepers',
but not industrial workers.64 Not only were rents, once again, prohibi-
tive, but the Bombay government had remained deaf to the press's
warning that if the housing scheme was intended to be `for the bene®t of
the people', provision for potential users' input into the planning process
was indispensable.65 It continued to regard the one-room tenement
model of working-class housing as sacrosanct and never seemed to have
considered alternatives;66 as it turned out, bad design and poor amenities
had again resulted in the production of sick buildings by yet another
colonial agency `out of touch with the life of the people for whom the
buildings were intended'. The majority of rooms had no water connec-
tions, nahanis (washing places), or lighting, and very inadequate chulha
(®replace for cooking purposes) and latrine provision. The chawls had
also been designed without the customary verandah, which poor tenants
had come to regard as their essential `breathing space'. Rooms had thus
no view of the sky and no perspective on the outside world.67 The
Archbishop of Bombay con®ded to the eminent architect Claude Batley
that he feared the DD chawls would turn into `centres of vice and crime'
because `there was no evidence of the milk of human kindness in their
design'.68
61 Government of Bombay, `Development proceedings, 1921', 49.
62 Bombay Chronicle, 29 Jun. 1920.
63 Government of Bombay, `Development proceedings, 1925', 105.
64 Government of Bombay, `Development proceedings, 1923', 67.
65 The Hindusthan, 21 Aug. 1920; `Bombay Native Newspaper Reports', 35, 1920.
66 In the House of Commons, Communist MP with Bombay antecedents Shipurji Saklatvala
accused the Bombay government of increasing the already staggering rate of infant
mortality in the city by its persistence in building these one-room tenements: Voice of
India, 25 Jun. 1923. `Bombay Native Newspaper Reports' 30, 1923.
67 Bombay Chronicle, 2 Jun. 1925 and 25 Oct. 1924.
68 C. Batley, `The importance of city planning', in C. Manshardt (ed.), Bombay Looks Ahead
(Bombay, 1934), 36.
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The Development Department had devised a housing project without
any of the architectural design, layout, sanitary and community con-
siderations characteristic of the best of contemporary urban planning
schemes. It represented a small-scale illustration of the extent to which,
in an era that witnessed the emergence of international town planning
movements, `planning' remained an alien and elusive concept for the
Bombay government to grasp. The local colonial state had taken the
initiative of seconding of®cials to study town-planning schemes in
English and German cities. The report on Germany, the acknowledged
world leader in the design of cheap working-class housing was particu-
larly enthusiastic,69 but its emphasis on the extensive nature of German
municipalities' powers and initiatives, particularly their strategic co-
ordinating role and their policy of urban land acquisition for public
purposes, merely exposed the political gulf separating this vision of
modern urbanism from the fragmented and anarchic administration of
Bombay city.
Empty suburbs, congested city streets
During this period, suburban development, an essential means of
reducing inner-city congestion, was another casualty of differing inter-
colonial interests. The Willingdon administration which came into of®ce
in 1913 was certainly more enthusiastic about railway electri®cation
than the previous Sydenham regime which had rejected the idea in its
1909 Resolution on the development of Bombay city. Indeed, another
government-appointed Bombay Development Committee assumed, in
1914, that electri®cation `up to the northern limit of Salsette residential
development' was imminent.70 The Bombay, Baroda and Central India
Railway Company already operated a rather slow, commercially-
oriented service between Colaba and Borivli in Salsette. Railways
enabled a deeper radial penetration into the northern suburbs than
tramways, and their electri®cation was essential for a quicker and more
frequent passenger service between Bombay and Salsette.
The Bombay government, however, stumbled on the opposition of the
Railway Board and the Government of India to expedite electri®cation.
The Board observed that electri®cation would not yield a `suf®ciently
satisfactory return on the capital expended', while the Government of
India baulked at the prospect of spending `a sum approximating to one
hundred thousand pounds'.71 Without the increase in both transport
mobility and capacity consequent upon rail electri®cation, any large-
scale population movement to the northern suburbs was impossible.
This would affect not only the projected settlement and development of
69 B.W Kissan, Report on Town-Planning Enactments in Germany (Bombay, 1913).
70 `Report of the Bombay Development Committee', xviii.
71 Government of Bombay, `Local self-government proceedings, 1915', 487±95.
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Salsette, i.e. the sparsely populated localities between Bandra and
Borivli, but also the regions immediately to the south, between Mahim
Creek and Dadar.
Indeed, suburban `town planning' closely followed the fragmented
model of the development of Bombay itself, in spite of the new Bombay
Town Planning Act of 1915. This was an extremely limited measure
which though couched in the modernist discourse of `planning', did not
re¯ect any new of®cial awareness of the necessary concomitant transfor-
mations in the role and functions of local government. Suburban devel-
opment schemes were conceived within an unchanged structure of local
government which in Salsette consisted of multiple and unequal local
authorities, all under the revenue jurisdiction not of the Bombay Muni-
cipal Corporation, but of the Northern Divisional Commissioner based
at Ahmedabad.72 Bandra, Kurla and Juhu had their own municipalities,
while Santa Cruz, Andheri, Vile Parle and Goregaon were under the
jurisdiction of `Noti®ed Area Committees' with considerably less
powers.73 Such arrangements rendered any co-ordination of services
across the whole of Salsette impossible. The Act thus failed to break with
the piecemeal and fragmented of®cial approach to urban development,
and continued to envisage building operations which did not simulta-
neously include any provision for water supply, drainage, sanitation and
transport.74
Moreover, infrastructural schemes were never supported by anything
like adequate funding. From 1913 onwards, the Bombay government
allocated a meagre annual grant of Rs. 40,000 ± or double a year's salary
of the newly appointed Special Of®cer, Salsette Building Sites ± to be
distributed by the latter amongst all suburban local authorities for
`original works' (primarily conceived as the construction of roads and
markets) in relation to residential town planning.75 Colonial parsimony,
compounded by the unco-ordinated nature of suburban `development',
ensured that by 1925, Salsette still had no drains, sewers, hospital or ®re
brigade services, very few schools, and only three dispensaries ± at
Bandra, Andheri and Kurla. Streets were lit with kerosene lamps, and
even these were described as `few and far between'.76 In these circum-
stances, suburban `town planning' amounted to a grave misnomer. By
the end of the 1920s, a suburban region about six times the surface area
of Bombay city only contained one-eighth of its population.77 Indeed,
72 Government of Bombay, `Development proceedings, 1920', 47. In contrast, the new
democratized post-war Glasgow Corporation was empowered to purchase suburban
land for expansion and, by the early 1920s, the ®rst phase of a gradual population
movement to the suburbs was under way: C. McKean, `Between the wars', in P. Reed
(ed.), Glasgow. The Forming of the City (Edinburgh, 1993), 132.
73 Government of Bombay, `Local self-government proceedings, 1925', 871±895.
74 Ibid., 1919, 449.
75 Ibid., 1913, 329; 1917, 381; 1918, 529.
76 Ibid., 1925, 873.
77 Bombay Chronicle, 2 Sep. 1923.
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one-third of the 150,000 inhabitants of Salsette lived in Bandra alone. Of
the other towns, Juhu was recorded as having a mere 1,851 inhabitants,
Santa Cruz 2,461, Andheri 6,510, Ghatkopar 8,168, and Vile Parle
11,290.78
The colonial political economy precluded the processes which were
enabling increased city-suburban mass mobility in post-First World War
Europe: the democratization of political power, the municipalization of
services and of suburban planning, the public control of transport
companies and its impact on fares.79 Although one of the major objec-
tives of his own especially created `Development Department' was the
development of south Salsette, the new post-war governor, George
Lloyd, attempted to dampen the hopes that plans for the northern
extension of the city had previously raised. He now argued, ironically
just as London suburban rail services were about to be electri®ed within
a 15±mile radius from Charing Cross, that there was `little analogy'
between Bombay and the `great urban' conurbations of London and
New York. There, suburbs were much closer to the heart of the city,
while from the Fort, `it was 12 miles to Bandra alone'. He could not
persuade the railway companies to electrify their lines; even if they did,
passengers could not be carried at cheap enough rates `to make the
clerical and business population willing to live there without some
considerable enhancement of their wages'; nor were such wage rises
desirable as they would simply mean `heavy new charges upon the
business trade of the city'.80 In a nutshell, Lloyd propounded the
negative logic that underlay colonial capitalism's lack of economic
dynamism which in turn dictated the fate of suburbanization.
If railway electri®cation was indispensable for vertical suburbaniza-
tion, the tramway could also play an important supporting role by
extending its lines northwards to link up with train stations, thus multi-
plying points of access and accelerating mobility between city and
suburbs. Unlike train services, the tramways were electri®ed between
1905 and 1908, a technological innovation virtually simultaneous with
street railway developments in Europe.81 However, while this technically
enabled a maximum speed of 18 m.p.h., in increasingly congested
streets, the average speed of the `electri®ed' trams averaged only 4.8
m.p.h. by 1925, slower than the old horse cars, and making the Bombay
tramways `the slowest in the world'.82
Although electri®cation enabled the running of more and bigger tram
78 Census of India, 1931: vol. ix, The Cities of the Bombay Presidency, 18±31.
79 Capuzzo, `Between politics and technology', 13.
80 Bombay Chronicle, 13 Aug. 1921.
81 Here the electri®cation period was generally between 1895 and 1901, e.g. Berlin
(1895±1899), Glasgow (1898±1901), Milan (1896±1900). London (1901±1905) followed
close behind: Capuzzo, `Between politics and technology', 4.
82 P.D. Mahaluxmivala, The History of the Bombay Electric Supply and Tramways Company
Limited 1905±1935 (Bombay, 1936), 237±9.
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cars and consequently led to a tripling of daily passengers between 1905
and 1925, they could only travel seven and a half miles more on the
electri®ed circuit than on the old horse tram network; moreover, the
overwhelming proportion of this extra mileage was taken up by exten-
sions to inner-city lines. Like the railway companies, the Bombay Electric
Supply and Tramways Company (BEST) was reluctant to undertake any
development `from which pro®t was not really or immediately discern-
ible'.83 Thus, the one-mile Parel-Dadar northward extension carried out
in 1917 was based on the knowledge that the meeting of the BB&CI and
GIP railway lines at Dadar would guarantee remunerative traf®c. Other-
wise, in the absence of ®nancial incentives from the Bombay government
or the Municipal Corporation, northward extensions, even within ex-
isting city limits, were not perceived as commercially viable. Indeed,
with the rise in the costs of materials and equipment, BEST became
unwilling to undertake virtually any proposed tramway development in
the post-war era. Instead, the Company switched investment to its
electricity supply branch, though it signi®cantly declined the option of
applying for the licence to supply Salsette.84 The increasing demand for
electric power from commercial and industrial enterprises, from govern-
ment of®ces, police and army buildings, from individuals and private
bodies for domestic and ceremonial purposes, the emergence of cinema
and of illuminated `neon' advertising signs, all combined to place the
supply of electricity at the cutting edge of commercial opportunity.85
With public transportation unable to sustain even `middle class' move-
ment towards the suburbs, the arrival of the private motor car and the
powerful commercial lobby that accompanied it soon accentuated the
elitist character of of®cial discourse on suburbanization. As elsewhere,
car ownership rapidly became a prime symbol of upper-class af¯uence.
From the small number initially registered in the city in 1905, cars
increased to over 2,000 by 1914; a decade later, they numbered around
10,000.86 The movable space of the automobile, moreover, also gave rise
to new built structures: between 1901 and 1921, newly erected garages
for motor vehicles contributed substantially to the increase in the
number of buildings in the city.87 High hopes arose amongst the various
development agencies that the motor car would become `a potent factor'
in the northward diffusion of the `wealthier classes', initially at least as
far as Matunga until amenities in Salsette were improved.88 The auto-
mobile, the Improvement Trust believed, would help overturn the lack of
demand for its plots in the north of the city. During the war years, the
83 `Report of the Bombay Development Committee', 30.
84 Mahaluxmivala, History, 381.
85 By the mid-1920s, it was solely the revenue derived from its electricity operations that
made BEST a pro®table enterprise: Bombay Chronicle, 18 Mar. 1926.
86 Annual Reports of the Bombay City Police 1914 and 1924.
87 Census of India, 1921: `Cities', vii.
88 `Report of the Bombay Development Committee', 148.
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Trust embarked on luxury residential schemes adjacent to the Worli and
Dharavi water fronts, designed `for the upper classes who can afford to
keep motor cars'.89
Once again, however, such hopes were misplaced. Even the motor car
failed to generate any major thoroughfare to the north of the city, or more
than one or two minor roads in the north itself, nor did it have any
substantial impact on road improvement during this period. Although
the long envisaged major north-south highway was ®nally embarked
upon by the Improvement Trust, the colonial state's post-war policy of
®nancial retrenchment made progress painfully slow. By 1924, the new
`Eastern Avenue' only comprised a two-mile extension of Parel Road
from Sandhurst Road to Lalbag.90 Although this section of Eastern
Avenue ± like the Trust's Princess Street and Sandhurst Road ± was
constructed with an asphalt surface and cement concrete bottom, few
other roads outside the Fort were able to withstand the crushing pressure
of the new motor vehicles.91 The macadam and mud surfaces often
tended to break up, while the rubber tyres of motor vehicles were held
responsible for throwing up `at least six times as much dust' as the iron
bound wheels of ox-carts and ticca-gharries (victorias).92 In an era before
the full health implications of air pollution from petroleum vehicle
exhausts were recognized, there was still considerable alarm, in a city
prone to respiratory diseases, at the `clouds of dust raised by passing
motor-cars which go to swell the doctor's bill and the city's death-rate'.93
By the mid-1920s, the 12,000 motor vehicles in circulation contributed
substantially to the increasing congestion, competing for street space
with trams, ox-carts, victorias, bicycles and pedestrians. Pedestrians
were now at risk in most of the inner-city roads: in the crowded
working-class neighbourhoods in the centre and north-west where
narrow thoroughfares also tended to have the busiest street life; but also
in the broader avenues of south Bombay where motorists were more
likely to indulge in the new `sport' of racing. The long, winding Queen's
Road was a particular danger spot with its three railway stations at
Churchgate, Marine Lines and Charni Road, unloading passengers
directly on to the main road, a situation described as having `no parallel'
in any other city.94 As elsewhere in the world, the fatalities and injuries
suffered by pedestrians were causing increasing concern. Victims tended
to be predominantly children and the elderly, the most vulnerable age-
89 Bombay Improvement Trust, `City Improvement Trust Report, 1916', 15.
90 Bombay Presidency Administration Report, 1923±24, 165.
91 Government of Bombay, `Local self-government proceedings, 1915', 90; Bombay Muni-
cipal Corporation, `Administration Report of the Municipal Commissioner, 1921±22',
ix±x.
92 Bombay Chronicle, 14 Nov. 1914.
93 Ibid., 23 Sep. 1920.
94 According to a committee appointed by the Bombay government to consider the `better
regulation of traf®c' in the city: Government of Bombay, `Judicial proceedings, 1923',
1320.
Colonial modernism in Bombay 253
groups to speeding traf®c.95 `Rash driving' was compounded by the
absence of an agreed system of signalling and the confusion over the
rules regarding overtaking ± on the right in the case of motor vehicles
and animal-drawn conveyances, but on the left in the case of tram cars.96
Moreover, the haphazard nature of the city's built structures meant the
existence of a large number of blind corners, while dust by day and poor
lighting by night aggravated problems of visibility.97
The Bombay pedestrian, whom in the view of the Bombay Gazette the
motor car was intended to awake from an alleged age-old `habit of
contemplation' and whose apparent `lack of traf®c sense' the police
tended to regard as responsible for most accidents, was perhaps not such
a singular individual after all. Indeed, there is little to suggest that his or
her response to the novel phenomenon of motorized street traf®c was
really different from their counterparts in European cities. Universally,
the arrival of the motor car now meant that the rules implicit in the
accustomed habit of walking the streets, when pedestrians merely had to
make small adjustments in their speed to avoid collisions with one
another, were no longer suf®cient. The mutually intelligible communica-
tion through glances and signs were obsolete in the face of the relentless-
ness of moving machines. The citizens of Bombay, as elsewhere, were
very liable at this stage to make errors in judging the `arrival' time of
motor vehicles moving at variable speeds. But, as in so many areas of
their social lives, they were far less able than their European contempor-
aries to draw on any substantial regulatory protective framework.98
Conclusion
During this phase of late industrial colonialism, urban development in
Bombay city was driven by a host of select, private and often competing
considerations which ultimately worked against the regeneration of the
city as a whole. Colonial spatial practice was dominated by the eco-
nomic, political and social needs of a small demographic minority;
moreover, these interests tended to be conceived in short-termist eco-
nomic cycles. While this enabled an expansion in landed, commercial
and industrial wealth and allowed the colonial government to spend
lavishly on architecturally grandiose projects, these bene®ts were
secured by an urban elite largely at the expense of the housing,
transportation, environmental health and public amenity needs of the
95 Annual Report of the Bombay City Police 1918, 17.
96 The Times of India Illustrated Weekly, 11 Jun. 1919; Government of Bombay, `Judicial
proceedings, 1920', 843.
97 Ibid., 1322±23.
98 Pedestrians were given little attention by traf®c police who were very reluctant to hold
up motor vehicle traf®c. As a result, they usually had to wait `for the passage of a long
stream of vehicles of all descriptions . . . with considerable loss of time and temper',
making them all the more liable to run across the street: Bombay Chronicle, 27 Sep. 1916.
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majority of the population, all of which required the adoption of long-
term urban planning perspectives. The economy of Bombay was reason-
ably af¯uent in the early twentieth century: only its people remained
poor.
The elite-focused development paradigms of the government of
Bombay invariably signi®ed that, in the absence of any sense of obliga-
tion to provide and fund social, welfare and city-wide infrastructural
services, the quickening of economic activity and selective spatial
improvements would not only fail to have any real impact on the
staggering levels of urban poverty: by directly contributing to both
higher living costs and deteriorating popular environments, `renewal'
actually worsened the plight of the urban poor. In effect, the urban
policies of the authoritarian colonial state amounted to a resistance
against the democratizing forces that were beginning to transform city
life in contemporary metropolitan Europe.99
99 For an elaboration of this argument see S. Hazareesingh, `The quest for urban citizen-
ship: civic rights, public opinion, and colonial resistance in early twentieth century
Bombay', Modern Asian Studies, 34, 4 (2000), 797±830.
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